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This paper contributes to the literature on agency theory by examining relations between family involvement 
and CEO compensation. Using a panel of 362 small U.S. listed firms, we analyze how founding families 
influence firm performance through option portfolio price sensitivity. Consistent with the dual agency 
framework, we find that family firms have lower CEO incentive pay, which is further reduced by higher 
executive ownership. Interestingly, such incentive pay offsets the positive impact that families have on firm 
valuation. Collectively, our results show that, compared with non-family firms, lower incentive pay adopted by 
family firms due to lower agency costs mitigates the direct effect of family involvement on firm performance. 
Once accounting for CEO incentive pay, we do not observe performance differences between family and 
non-family firms. 
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Introduction 
In modern corporations, there exists a common organizational form characterized by dispersed ownership, 
atomistic shareholders, and separation between ownership and control. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Shleifer 
and Vishny (1986) have long argued that this type of firm is not a comprehensive form of publicly traded 
corporation. In the past two decades, the economic importance of family firms around the world has been widely 
recognized in the literature (e.g., Claessens, Djankov, and Lang 2000; Faccio and Lang 2002; La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 1999; Morck, Strangeland, and Yeung 2000), motivating an emerging body of 
research on family firms with respect to various issues (e.g., Anderson, Duru, and Reeb 2012; Anderson, Mansi, 
and Reeb 2003; Koropp, Grichnik, and Kellermanns 2013). This study examines the relationships between 
different types of family firms, non-family firms and agency costs through the pay incentive mechanisms of 
CEO compensation schemes. Although academic literature on family firms and executive compensation is 
proliferating, it focuses largely on cash incentives (e.g., Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino, 2003; Block, 2011; 
Michiels, Voordeckers, Lybaert, and Steijvers, 2013) and/or current-year compensation based on firm stock (e.g., 
McConaughy, 2000; Sapp, 2008; Li and Srinivasan, 2011). Our paper complements and extends the existing 
literature by considering not only stock options granted in the current year but also all other stock options and 
equity-based compensation awarded to CEOs during their tenures. This approach is especially attractive because 
it allows us to utilize the information on the total power of CEO performance-based incentive pay.  
Outstanding executive stock options, that have not yet been exercised, together with ownership of firm 
equity as held by executive, comprise executive’s wealth portfolio. We estimate the sensitivity of the value of 
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this portfolio to changes in a firm’s stock price (delta), relying on the high accuracy method developed by Core 
and Guay (2002), and used extensively in the literature (see, e.g., Brockman, Martin, and Unlu, 2010; Kim, Li, 
and Zhang, 2011; Liu and Mauer, 2011). Empirically, it has been shown that the greater is the sensitivity of an 
executive’s option portfolio to changes in the firm’s stock price (delta), the greater are its value-enhancing 
incentives. Moreover, recent research documents that value-improving incentives are positively and 
significantly related to firm value (see, e.g., O’Connor and Rafferty, 2010).  
We address our research question, which is rooted in the agency theory, using a sample of 362 small publicly 
listed U.S. firms during the period of 2001-2005. Among U.S. public firms, family firms are prevalent and 
persistent forms of organization (see, e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Holderness 2009). Similar to e.g., 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) and using hand-collected data, we classify our sample firms into active family firms 
(run by family member CEO), passive family firms (run by outside CEO), and non-family firms. Under the dual 
agency framework, we posit that family and non-family firms have different agency costs. More specifically, 
due to severe owner-manager conflict, agency costs are higher in non-family firms while active and passive 
family firms have comparable agency costs. Therefore, non-family firms should have higher CEO incentive pay 
than family firms. Next, we examine the impact of equity ownership on the level of the granted pay incentives. 
We hypothesize that high equity stake, which provides value-enhancing incentives per se, reduces the need for 
additional incentives created by executive stock options. Lastly, we use the structural equation model (SEM) to 
investigate the relation between performance measures and pay incentives. We conjecture that incentives which 
stem from executive stock option grants and other equity-based instruments mediate the mere impact of family 
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firms on performance. 
Our study adds to the literature in several aspects. First, we analyze relations between family firms and 
agency costs through a direct incentive pay metric (option portfolio delta), rather than using absolute pay levels 
as in Bartholomeusz and Tanewski (2006) and Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, and Makri (2003) and 
pay-for-performance sensitivity in McConaughy (2000). Hence, this paper contributes to this line of literature 
regarding CEO compensation in family firms by using a better construct for incentive-alignment purposes. 
Unlike Gomez-Mejia et al. (2003) and McConaughy (2000), our analysis includes non-family firms too. Second, 
we refine the typical categorization of "family versus non-family" firms in terms of degree of ownership by 
family members. Similar to e.g., Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Barontini and Caprio (2006), we classify firms 
into three different types that reflect varying degrees of family involvement both in ownership structure and in 
the management. We argue that the CEO’s identity regarding family affiliation matters as well. Indeed, we find 
that the incentive pay appears to differ significantly across different types of family firms, a result which could 
not be produced by the traditional family firm categorization. Lastly, our study also adds to the literature on the 
determinants of CEO incentive compensation as well as the literature on corporate policies and firm valuation. 
This paper shows that once accounting for CEO incentive pay adopted by firms under varying degrees of family 
control, we do not observe performance differentials across different types of firms. Besides, our results provide 
evidence that the influence of family ownership is beyond that of typical concentrated ownership. Therefore, 
research on incentive compensation and firm valuation without considering family presence could result in 
spurious relations and false implications. 
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The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: (1) a brief literature review on family firms relating to dual 
agency problems and CEO compensation, which is followed by development of hypotheses to be tested; (2) a 
description of data collection, sample formation, and methodology of empirical analyses; (3) results of the 
empirical tests; (4) discussion and practical implications; and (5) concluding remarks. 
Hypothesis Development 
Modern organizations are plagued by agency problems. In a diffusely held firm, the major agency problem 
emerges as a conflict of interest between managers and shareholders. Managers control the resources and run the 
firm, whereas dispersed shareholders own the firm but are excluded from management. Because equity 
ownership by managers is typically low, they pay only a fraction of the costs related to misuse of firm resources 
for their own benefits. Consequently, managers do not always act in the best interests of shareholders (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). This type of agency problem is called a “classic owner-manager 
conflict” (Villalonga and Amit, 2006) and is prevalent among firms characterized by separation between 
ownership and control. Throughout the paper, we refer to this type of agency problem as Agency Problem I.  
Another type of agency problem arises between large shareholders and minority shareholders. Large 
shareholders may pursue interests that are at odds with the objectives of the remainder of shareholders who are a 
minority. Expropriation of the minority may be feasible owing to the controlling position that large shareholders 
have in such firms (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). This type of agency problem dominates in closely held firms, for 
example, firms controlled by families. In this paper we label this type of agency problem Agency Problem II.  
Clearly, agency problems intertwine, such that family firms are not entirely free of owner-manager conflicts, 
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and diffusely held firms are not entirely free of the expropriation by large shareholders. Recent empirical 
research documents that ownership of a typical U.S. firm is fairly diffuse; however, it cannot be considered 
atomistic (see, e.g, Helwege, Pirinsky, and Stultz, 2007). For instance, Holderness (2009) shows that 89% of his 
sample S&P500 firms have at least one blockholder. Concentration of ownership by blockholders (financial 
institutions, corporations, etc.), gives rise to Agency Problem II as defined in the section above, which is 
arguably more severe in a typical U.S. firm than what it would otherwise be if the equity ownership of the firm 
was atomistic. Nevertheless, if a firm has e.g., an institutional blockholder, private benefits extracted from the 
remaining dispersed shareholders by that blockholder are split among a few independent owners (Villalonga and 
Amit, 2006). Consequently, the incentives to expropriate shareholders in a diffuse ownership firm with an 
institutional or a corporate blockholder are lower as compared to a closely-held firm with a controlling 
blockholder (e.g., a family) because this controlling blockholder can divert all private benefits of control to itself. 
In other words, non-family firms, especially with blockholders, are not exempt from Agency Problem II, but 
such agency costs are generally lower compared to family-controlled firms.                               
The magnitude of agency costs that stem from different types of agency problems varies depending on the 
relationship between ownership and control. Existing research shows that family firms in which CEOs are 
members of the controlling families significantly outperform non-family firms (see, e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 
2003; Barontini and Caprio, 2006; Maury, 2006; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). In addition, family firms with 
outside professional CEOs have been shown to be more valuable than non-family firms (see, e.g., Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003; Barontini and Caprio, 2006; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). The empirical evidence leads us to 
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conclude that family firms have agency costs that are lower than agency costs of non-family firms. Arguably, 
this difference in the magnitude of agency costs is attributable to the negative effects of owner-manager 
conflicts in diffuse ownership firms. For instance, Villalonga and Amit (2006) argue that outperformance of 
family firms suggests that divergent interests of managers and shareholders are more damaging to shareholder 
wealth than conflicting objectives of minority and large shareholders. 
Building on the above arguments, we conjecture that, due to differences in the degree of owner-manager 
conflicts, family firms have lower agency costs as compared to non-family firms. The reasons for this are 
twofold. First, firms controlled and run by families do not have owner-manager conflicts and thus agency costs 
that result from divergent interest between management and shareholders. Second, family-controlled firms with 
hired professional CEOs incur agency costs that stem from separation of ownership and control; however, the 
families involved are typically large controlling shareholders that can monitor management more effectively 
than disperse shareholders can. Hence, family firms with outside CEOs have lower agency costs associated with 
owner-manager conflicts than non-family firms. With regard to the magnitude of agency costs that result from 
conflicts with large shareholders, we posit that in non-family firms, these costs are significantly lower as 
compared to family firms. Furthermore, existing theoretical and empirical research provides no clear indication 
that this type of agency costs should differ across different types of family firms. We speculate that the level of 
Agency Problem II increases with the fraction of equity ownership held by large shareholder beyond a given 
threshold at which entrenchment effect begins to dominate (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). However, we 
cannot conjecture that families should hold higher/lower equity ownership in active family firms as vis-à-vis 
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passive family firms. Theory and prior empirical work do not provide a consensus view on the relationship 
between the size of family equity stake and the identity of management in family firms. These arguments 
together suggest that agency costs related to Agency Problem II in active and passive family firms could be of 
comparable magnitude. 
To diminish the owner-manager conflict and thus the magnitude of agency costs, firms should adopt 
incentive compensation systems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). More specifically, firms should use executive call 
options on firm stock and/or option-like instruments to better align managers’ interests with those of outside 
shareholders (Haugen and Senbet, 1981; Smith and Stulz, 1985). The theoretical arguments advanced above are 
consistent with existing empirical evidence. For example, Jensen and Murphy (1990), Hall and Liebman (1998), 
and Frydman and Saks (2010) show that firms extensively use executive stock options to incentivize top 
management. Moreover, these studies indicate a positive and significant relationship between firm performance 
and value-increasing pay incentives.  
Furthermore, previous research documents that both family CEOs and outside CEOs in family firms receive 
value-enhancing incentives based on firm equity. For example, McConaughy (2000) reports positive 
pay-performance sensitivity of executive stock options for family and non-family CEOs. Michiels et al. (2013) 
find that pay-for-performance plays a significant role in privately-held family firms run by families and outside 
CEOs. From a somewhat different perspective, Schulze et al. (2003) argue that altruism in family firms 
compromises the ability of family CEOs to monitor and discipline other family members in top management, 
thus family firms should grant value-enhancing pay incentives to all family senior executives. 
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In light of the above discussion of theoretical predictions regarding both types of agency problem and the 
empirical evidence that the classic ownership-manager conflict in non-family firms is more costly than the 
conflict between family and non-family shareholders in family firms, we posit that non-family firms should 
adopt greater value-increasing pay incentives relative to family firms. This conjecture stems from the fact that, 
as compared to family firms, non-family firms have higher agency costs attributable to agency conflicts between 
management and disperse shareholders. The above predictions can be formalized as follows: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Non-family firms have higher agency costs than family firms, hence non-family firms should 
adopt higher value-enhancing pay incentives than family firms. 
Agency problems can be alleviated by equity ownership which provides incentives to maximize shareholder 
wealth. Therefore, equity ownership can be viewed as a substitute for incentive pay. According to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), low stock ownership may be the most important source of manager-shareholder conflict. In 
diffusely held firms, manager ownership is accumulated mainly through the exercise of executive stock options. 
Typically, option awards are granted to senior executives on a regular basis throughout their job tenures at firms. 
It is not uncommon, however, for grants to be made several times during the fiscal year. Interestingly, new 
CEOs, when assuming office, receive exceptionally large stock option awards of firm shares to instantly provide 
them with a critical mass of equity ownership. Overall, managers’ ownership stake should increase with the 
length of their tenures, thus increasing their value-enhancing incentives. However, despite the use of stock 
options and other types of stock-based compensation for the purpose of providing senior executives with a stake 
in the firm, Ofek and Yermack (2000) show that executives accumulate stock ownership only up to a certain 
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point, after which they actively trade their holdings.  
In a typical family-controlled firm, low equity ownership by management is not a major concern. Family 
firms usually own a substantial fraction of equity enabling them to exercise control over the firm. The size of the 
average ownership stake for the largest U.S. family firms is approximately 17% (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; 
Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Moreover, Holderness (2009) reports that blockholders (including families) own on 
average 39% of the common stock of publicly listed firms in the U.S. Such concentrated ownership provides 
incentives to monitor outside CEOs and reduces the need to load managers with executive stock options to boost 
equity ownership. In light of the above discussion, we formulate our next hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Equity ownership provides value-enhancing incentives per se, hence high equity ownership 
should markedly reduce the need for value-increasing pay incentives. 
As noted above, firms with high agency costs should adopt value-enhancing incentive pay. In other words, 
such incentive pay is viewed as a remedy to typical agency problems, and thus should effectively improve 
performance ex-post. For the purpose of this study, we believe that it is crucial to account for value-increasing 
pay incentives when assessing the impact of family control on firm performance. Prior research on family firms 
largely ignores the role of compensation incentives in value creation and typically does not include information 
on pay incentives in empirical specification (see, e.g., Barontini and Caprio, 2006; Maury, 2006; Villalonga and 
Amit, 2006). We conjecture that if controlled for performance-enhancing incentives, the mere effect of family 
control on performance could diminish. The above discussion motivates the final hypothesis in our study: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Incentive pay mediates the relation between family involvement and firm performance, 
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hence the difference in performance between different types of family firms and non-family firms should be less 
pronounced. 
Methods 
Data and Sample     
Our analysis focuses on small firms because, in addition to their economic significance1, small firms tend to 
be young and have more concentrated ownership, as it has been shown that a decrease in insider ownership is a 
positive function of time elapsed after an IPO (Helwege, Pirinsky, and Stulz, 2007). Therefore, among small 
firms we should expect a higher proportion of family firms. As family firms have less severe agency problems 
than non-family firms, a typical small firm should have lower agency costs than a typical large firm. Besides, a 
well-known stylized fact about executive compensation is that the value of executive pay packages rises with 
firm size. Large firms are more complex, often diversified, and thus more difficult to manage. Accordingly, large 
firms attract top talent who are granted high levels of total compensation as compared to top executives in small 
firms (Gabaix and Landier, 2008). In the context of our study, nevertheless, there is little theoretical and/or 
empirical literature indicating different compensation structures with firm size. 
We form our sample from companies in the S&P600 SmallCap Index between 2001 and 2005, the most 
recent period with no major disruptive economic events. Our sample starts in 2001, so that we can avoid 
market-based performance measures that were significantly inflated in 2000 when the dot-com bubble reached 
                                                     
1 According to the 2009 OECD report, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) account for more than 99% of all 
enterprises in the European Union and more than half of the labor force in the private sector in the OECD area. 
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its climax. Our sample ends in 2005 because in 2006, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission introduced 
new disclosure rules on executive pay, so that the most recent compensation data are not fully compatible with 
the pre-2006 format. Hence, our sample period is also relatively free of major financial or regulatory events. We 
exclude firms in this Index that did not survive the full sample period, ensuring that our sample firms remain 
relatively small. We further exclude utility (SIC codes 1311, 4911 to 4991) and financial firms (SIC codes 6020 
to 6799) because these firms are typically under government regulations that might affect their investment 
policies and ownership structures. We also exclude spin-off firms. These sample selection criteria result in 1,756 
firm-year observations representing 362 unique firms. We match our final sample with available accounting data 
in Compustat, compensation data in ExecuComp, and corporate governance data in RiskMetrics. 
To identify family firms, we manually check proxy statements for each company along with other sources 
when needed2, providing us with the following information: identity, ownership, tenure, and biographies of 
founder(s), board members, blockholders, and the top-five managers when such information is available. We 
classify family firms based on two dimensions, i.e., family affiliation of board members (control) and of CEOs 
(management). Following Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Villalonga and Amit (2006), we classify a firm with 
family control as long as one of the following two criteria is met: (1) the founder or a descendant of the founder 
sits on the board and/or is a blockholder; (2) at least two board members are related either by blood or marriage. 
Overall, 48.46% of the sample observations are affiliated with founding families, 46.41% are run and owned by 
outsiders, and 5.13% are affiliated with non-founding families. We include non-founding family firms among 
                                                     
2 We utilize several online sources, such as http://www.fundinguniverse.com/. 
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family-controlled firms in our sample (e.g., Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester, and Cannella, 2007)3. Among our 
1,756 firm-year observations, 546 (31.09%) are of active family firms, 395 (22.49%) are of passive family firms, 
and 815 (46.41%) are of non-family firms. It is true that in our sample (of small publicly-traded firms), family 
firms are more common than non-family firms compared to their more established counterparts. But this does 
not affect our analysis because our main focus is the comparison between family and non-family firms. 
Measures     
Incentive Pay Our main estimator of incentive pay is the CEO option portfolio price sensitivity delta. Generally, 
we follow Core and Guay (2002) and Brockman et al. (2010) in using this estimate, which is defined as the 
change in the value of a CEO’s stock holding and option portfolio in response to a 1% change in the firm’s stock 
price. Partial derivatives of the option price with respect to stock price (delta δ) are based on the Black-Scholes 
model (1973) for valuing European call options, adjusted for dividend payouts by Merton (1973)
4
. In our study, 
we assume that incentive pay serves as a remedy for agency problems. In other words, incentive pay captures 
the magnitude of agency costs for different types of firm in our sample. 
Performance We use two measures of firm performance, namely, return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q (Q), 
which summarize information on operating and market performance, respectively. ROA is calculated by 
dividing the earnings before interest and taxes by total assets. This ratio is an accounting measure of 
performance, where performance can also be viewed as realized performance (backward-looking). Q is the 
market-to-book ratio, defined as the market value of assets scaled by their book value. In contrast to ROA, Q is 
                                                     
3 In some cases, we cannot obtain founder information. It is also likely that we lose track of founding family members. Thus, 
we underestimate the true proportion of family firms in the sample. This would potentially work against our testing 
hypotheses. 
4 For instance, see Brockman et al. (2010) for a detailed description of the computation of the option delta.  
13 
 
viewed as a measure of firm valuation (forward-looking). Bartholomeusz and Tanewski (2006) argue that Q can 
be used to measure deviations from wealth maximization. In this paper, we adopt both measures, providing us 
with different perspectives on firm performance.    
Control Variables In our regression analysis, to avoid confounding effects, we include several control variables 
that have been found to influence incentive pay and/or performance (e.g., Coles, Daniel and Naveen 2006; Kale, 
Reis, and Venkateswaran 2009). For incentive pay, we use CEO age and ownership, firm size, firm age, leverage, 
investment, and a set of corporate governance proxies for minority shareholder protection and board 
structure/independence. To measure minority shareholder protection, we use the GIM Index (Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick 2003) and the Entrenchment Index (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 2009). Higher index scores imply 
that more anti-takeover provisions have been adopted by firms, suggesting less protection for minority 
shareholders. For performance, we include firm size, firm age, firm risk, leverage, investment, dividend payouts, 
and three corporate governance proxies for board structure/independence. We provide detailed definitions and 
data sources for all variables in the regression analysis in Appendix A. 
Empirical Specification 
To analyze the relations between incentive pay (delta) and family firm type (to test H1 and H2), we employ 
a Tobit model (e.g., Hartzell and Starks 2003) due to the intermittent feature of option grants as compensation. 
The main model specification is as follows: 
Incentive Pay=β1*△(MV)+β2*△(MV)*D(Passive Family Firm)+β3*△(MV)*D(Active Family 
Firm)+β4*D(Passive Family Firm)+β5*D(Active Family Firm)+∑𝛽𝑘(Control Variables) 
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where △(MV) is the change in market capitalization in the current year. Two dummy variables proxy for 
family firm types. In each specification, we control for year fixed effects and industry fixed effects, using 1-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. Standard deviations are clustered at the 1-digit SIC level. Our 
main coefficients of interest are β4 and β5, which are both predicted to have negative values, according to H1. 
To examine whether (family) ownership has differential effects on incentive pay, for each firm type, we form 
two subgroups based on ownership and run separate regressions. Estimates of the ownership variable capture the 
direct effect of ownership in six different subgroups. Specifically, we simplify our aforementioned model 
specification as follows: 
Incentive Pay=β1*△(MV)+ β2*Ownership+∑𝛽𝑘(Control Variables) 
Our main coefficient of interest is β2, which is expected to differ (in terms of magnitude and/or sign) in the 
two subgroups for each type of family firm, according to H2. 
Next, to test H3, i.e., whether value-enhancing incentive pay adopted by families effectively addresses 
agency problems, we adopt a structural equation model (SEM) that encompasses a wide range of models by 
considering various paths (causality) and correlations between variables, both dependent and independent. 
Relevant to our purposes, a properly specified structural equation model can be used to address endogeneity 
issues and produce estimates similar to those of seemingly unrelated regression or simultaneous equation 
analyses, among other desirable features (Tomarken and Waller, 2005). The path diagram in our structural model 
is displayed in Figure 1. A path, shown as an arrow drawn from one variable to another, indicates a (causal) 
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relationship between two variables.  
[Please insert Figure 1 here] 
As shown in Figure 1, there are two sets of linear regressions in the model, one related to performance 
(direct effect) and one related to decisions regarding incentive pay, which are allowed to further affect 
performance (indirect effect). We also specify variables to be correlated (based on the correlations between 
variables of interest). Standard deviations are clustered at the industry-level. Note that, to test our hypothesis 
properly, family presence is allowed to directly impact performance. This can capture the effects of missing 
variables or any channels other than incentive pay through which families may affect performance. Accordingly 
to H3, the direct and indirect effects of family presence on performance should have opposite signs. The sum of 
the direct and indirect effects (i.e., the total effect) should not be significantly different from zero. Specifically, 
the model specification is as follows, 
Performance=β1*Incentive Pay+β2*D(Passive Family Firm)+β3*D(Active Family 
Firm)+∑𝛽𝑖(Firm-Specific Control Variables) 
Incentive Pay=γ1*D(Passive Family Firm)+γ2*D(Active Family Firm) )+γ3*CEO Age+∑𝛾𝑗(Firm-Specific 
and Corporate Governance Control Variables) 
The direct effect of family presence on performance is β2 (passive) and β3 (active), and the indirect effect of 
family presence on performance is β1* γ1 (passive) and β1* γ2 (active). Therefore, the total effects are β2+ β1* γ1 
and β3+ β1* γ2 for passive and active family firms, respectively. 
Results 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for selected CEO- and firm-specific attributes for the whole sample. 
Table 2 presents between-sample comparisons of these attributes.  
[Please insert Tables 1 and 2 here] 
Generally, CEOs in active family firms have the lowest median cash-based and total compensation. The 
CEO option delta (including stock holdings) is highest in active family firms while on average option delta 
(without stock holding) is lowest in passive family firms. In addition to the compensation components, we find 
that CEOs in active family firms are older and have much larger equity stakes.  
With regard to firm-specific characteristics, there is, as a whole, no significant difference among the three 
firm types in terms of firm size, investment level, and operating performance. Compared with non-family firms, 
family firms (active and passive) have higher Q and issue less debt. Passive family firms pay higher dividends. 
Firms managed by founding families tend to be young and face higher firm risk. In addition, such firms are less 
entrenched than other firms, with fewer anti-takeover provisions and smaller boards of directors, which are 
generally viewed as more effective (Yermack 1996). However, their boards are less independent, and their CEOs 
are more likely to serve as chairman and sit on compensation committees. Note that it is least likely that an 
outside CEO serves as chairman when there is family control within the firm which tends to have largest board 
size. These results are consistent with Bartholomeusz and Tanewski (2006) and family firms adopt corporate 
governance structures that differ substantially from those of non-family firms.  
Primary Findings 
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Table 3 presents standardized coefficients, estimated by a Tobit regression, for the determinants of CEO 
incentive pay.  
[Please insert Table 3 here] 
Models (1)-(7) use option-based incentive pay (option delta only) as the dependent variable. The reasons we 
adopt option-based incentive pay, rather than equity-based incentive pay (sum of stock delta and option delta), 
as our main measure of incentive pay are as follows
5
. First, we expect founding family CEOs to have the highest 
equity-based incentive pay because of the high degree of family ownership of such firms. This positive 
relationship may arise for control purposes more than incentive purposes. Moreover, downside risk entails 
greater misalignment of managerial incentives when executives receive options rather than straight equity 
(Chidambaran and Prabhala 2003). Therefore, option grants appear to reflect incentive pay more effectively than 
straight equity. Another benefit of using option-based incentive pay is that it enables us to separate the effect of 
family influence from that of concentrated ownership. Model (1) is the baseline model, which does not take 
family influence and corporate governance into consideration. Models (2)-(4) include family influence and 
different measures of corporate governance. In addition to pooled regressions, we conduct subsample 
regressions in Models (5) and (6), based on CEO (family) ownership, to examine whether concentrated 
ownership has varying effects on the determinants of CEO incentive pay. Finally, Model (7) includes the square 
of ownership as an additional explanatory variable to test whether ownership effects are nonlinear. 
At first glance, the explanatory power of the main models appears to be much greater than that of the 
                                                     
5 As a robustness check, we use equity-based incentive pay as one alternative measure of incentive pay. 
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baseline model, suggesting that family influence and corporate governance help explain CEO incentive pay. In 
general, portfolio price sensitivity is positively related to changes in shareholder wealth (although the relation is 
not statistically significant). This positive relationship, however, weakens once family involvement and/or 
corporate governance are taken into account. Moreover, when key control variables are accounted for, 
conditional on past performance, CEOs have similar incentive pay, regardless of family involvement. As shown 
in Model (1), ownership itself, independently of family involvement and corporate governance, is negatively 
correlated with incentive pay. This supports the notion that ownership creates incentives and thus reduces the 
need for incentive pay. Controlling for ownership and unconditional on past performance, option-based 
incentive pay is significantly lower for family firms than for non-family firms, with similar estimates (lower 
levels) for active and passive family firms. This finding supports H1. Meanwhile, managerial ownership itself is 
no longer related to incentive pay. Additionally, CEO age is negatively associated with incentive pay. 
With respect to firm-specific control variables, our results show that larger firms with higher investment 
levels tend to have higher incentive pay, which is also observed in young firms with less debt. With regard to the 
relationship between corporate governance and incentive pay, our findings are mixed. On the one hand, the 
estimated coefficients for the GIM and Entrenchment indexes are positive for incentive pay. In other words, 
weaker minority shareholder protection is associated with higher incentive pay, which suggests that these two 
governance mechanisms are substitutes. On the other hand, smaller boards with greater independence (except in 
cases of CEO duality) - a mode of corporate governance typically viewed as superior - are likely to implement 
higher incentive pay, which suggests that these mechanisms are complements. Hence, our results indicate that 
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corporate governance is a complex system in which the underlying mechanisms cannot be simply described as 
substitutes or complements. In summary, when option portfolio price sensitivity is viewed as an 
incentive-alignment mechanism, our results suggest that both active and passive family firms have lower agency 
costs than non-family firms. This supports the notion that the classic ownership-manager conflict (Agency 
Problem I) in non-family firms is more costly than the conflict between family and non-family shareholders 
(Agency Problem II) in founder-CEO firms, a finding that is consistent with Villalonga and Amit (2006).  
Although we find no linear relationship between managerial ownership and incentive pay when family 
presence is taken into account, the relationship could be non-linear. To examine this possibility, we form two 
subgroups based on different levels of ownership (low versus high, with median ownership over the whole 
sample providing the cutoff point) and conduct similar analyses. Interestingly, in Models (5) and (6), we find 
that the relationship between managerial ownership and option-based incentive pay is not symmetric. 
Ownership increases incentive pay in the low ownership subgroup, whereas it decreases incentive pay in the 
high ownership subgroup. This also shows that the negative overall relationship between ownership and 
incentive pay in Model (1) is driven by the high ownership subgroup. In Model (7), we find a concave 
relationship between managerial ownership and option-based incentive pay, as the estimate of ownership is 
positive, and the estimate of its square is negative. 
To further investigate whether ownership creates value-enhancing incentives that reduce the need for 
value-enhancing pay incentives, we divide our sample into six subgroups based on varying degrees of family 
involvement and (managerial/family) ownership and conduct similar analyses for each of these groups. Table 4 
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provides standardized coefficient estimates for the Tobit regression of incentive pay in active family, passive 
family, and non-family firms, contingent on CEO ownership.  
[Please insert Table 4 here] 
We focus here on the CEO equity-based ownership variable. In general, the results for family firms are 
similar to those for Models (5) and (6) in Table 3. In terms of absolute value, a CEO with high ownership tends 
to have high incentive pay, regardless of family presence
6
. However, for family firms, the incremental effect of 
ownership on incentive pay is negative when the CEO has high ownership and positive otherwise, as shown in 
Models (1)-(4). This asymmetric or nonlinear pattern appears to be more pronounced in passive family firms 
than in active family firms, perhaps reflecting effective monitoring by board members who are members of 
founding families. In Models (5) and (6), we do not observe this pattern in non-family firms, where the 
relationship between ownership and incentive pay appears to be unaffected by managerial ownership. In sum, 
our results suggest that high equity ownership by CEOs provides value-enhancing incentives. Equity ownership 
by CEOs thus appears to alleviate concerns about misaligned incentives or agency issues, resulting in lower 
incentive pay, especially in family firms and to a lesser degree in non-family firms. This finding supports H2.  
CEO Incentive Pay and Performance 
In this section, we examine how incentive pay in family firms affects performance or firm valuation while 
controlling for important determinants of both incentive pay and firm valuation. Following the structural 
equation model discussed above (Figure 1), Table 5 reports coefficient estimates representing the direct, indirect, 
                                                     
6 In both the high and low ownership groups, the level of incentive pay is lower among passive family firms than among 
both active family and non-family firms. These results are not tabulated but are available upon request. 
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and total effects of our variables of interest on firm performance.  
[Please insert Table 5 here] 
Overall, incentive pay enhances firm performance. Therefore, value-enhancing incentive pay itself is 
effective ex-post. Interestingly, the indirect effect of family involvement via incentive pay is negative, offsetting 
the positive direct effect of family involvement on firm valuation. In other words, lower incentive pay set by 
families mediates the direct relationship between family involvement and firm performance compared with 
non-family firms. With regard to control variables, we find that managerial ownership does not affect 
performance. In addition, we find that firm size is positively associated with ROA but negatively associated with 
Q. Firm age, firm risk, and leverage are negatively related to firm performance. Corporate investment enhances 
Q, while higher dividend payout is associated with better firm performance
7
. Moreover, the total effect of family 
involvement on either ROA or Q is not significantly different from zero, suggesting that family presence is 
neither value enhancing nor detrimental to corporate performance. This finding also indicates that family firms 
have market valuations similar to those of non-family firms, after accounting for the mediating effect of 
incentive pay and controlling for key factors that drive firm valuation. Altogether, these results support H3.  
Sensitivity Analyses 
In this section, we conduct robustness checks of the incentive pay analysis (H1 testing) and the performance 
analysis (H3 testing) by applying alternative estimation models.  
                                                     
7 Our two-stage-least-squares regression estimates for these control variables are similar to the SEM estimates, which are 
available upon request.  
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First, one concern regarding the relationship between family presence and incentive pay is possible reverse 
causality. For example, family members might only be appointed to CEO positions in firms with particular pay 
packages, in which case, causality would run from incentive pay to family control. To address this endogeneity 
concern, we follow the two-stage strategy employed by Pindado, Requejo, and de la Torre (2012) in the context 
of dividend policy. Specifically, we run first-stage logit regressions of our sample for each year from 2001 to 
2005 to estimate the probability that a firm is family-controlled. Consistent with Pindado et al. (2012), we use 
ownership, dual share class, firm size, firm risk, and Q as explanatory variables. We then estimate the empirical 
specifications in the incentive pay models (Models (2)-(7) in Table 3) by using the fitted family dummies
8
 in 
the Tobit regressions. Similarly to Table 3, Panel A in Table 6 provides standardized coefficients for the 
determinants of CEO incentive pay, estimated by a Tobit regression. We do not report estimates of the 
firm-specific control variables for simplicity.  
Overall, our main results hold under this alternative estimation method. When we control for reverse 
causality, the explanatory power of the main models (Models (1)-(3)) is slightly higher than Models (2)-(4) in 
Table 3. The estimates of the two family dummy variables, our main variables of interest, have similar values 
and the same signs as the estimates presented in Table 3. The non-linear or concave relationship between 
managerial ownership and incentive pay also remains.    
Second, we use a dynamic panel generalized method of moments (i.e., system GMM) to replicate the 
performance analysis in the previous section. Specifically, we follow Wintoki, Linck, and Netter (2012) in using 
                                                     
8 Two separate logit regressions and one multinomial logit regression all yield the same fitted values. 
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a dynamic GMM estimator to alleviate endogeneity concerns, which are rampant in corporate governance 
research, i.e., unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity. The system GMM model potentially helps us estimate 
the governance-performance relationship while simultaneously controlling for past performance and 
fixed-effects. Including past performance in the data generating process accounts for the dynamic aspects 
involved. At the same time, the fixed-effects capture time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity that may 
characterize such a relationship. Panel B in Table 6 reports the GMM coefficient estimates for our variables of 
interest, the results of the specification tests, and the results of a test of the exogeneity of a subset of our 
instruments
9
. We do not report estimates of the firm-specific control variables for simplicity. 
The system GMM estimates suggest that incentive pay increases Q but not ROA. Thus, incentive pay 
effectively enhances market valuation but not accounting or realized performance after some endogeneity issues 
in the model have been addressed. The differences in performance between family and non-family firms are not 
statistically significant, a finding that is consistent with our main results for the previous structural models. 
Overall, family firms and non-family firms exhibit similar performance after controlling for important 
determinants such as past performance and fixed-effects. We cannot reject the hypothesis that our instruments 
are valid because the p-value for the Hansen test of over-identification is above the 10% threshold in all four 
model specifications. 
[Please insert Table 6 here] 
As a final part of the sensitivity analyses, we use equity-based incentive pay as an alternative measure of 
                                                     
9 We use xtabond2 in Stata to generate the system GMM estimators and the test results. 
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incentive pay to test the robustness of our findings. Basically, our results are qualitatively the same (not 
tabulated and available upon request). One main difference is that, unconditional on past performance, 
equity-based incentive pay is highest among active family firms and lowest among passive family firms. This is 
not surprising, as family CEOs own substantial equity stakes in family-controlled firms, likely for the control 
purposes as noted before. In addition, CEO age is positively associated with equity-based incentive pay. Lastly, 
the indirect effect of active family firms via incentive pay is positive, although the total effect on performance or 
firm valuation is not significantly different from zero. 
Discussion and Implications 
In this paper, we have revisited agency theory and examined the relationship between founding families and 
agency costs via the design of CEO compensation. Rather than the absolute level of CEO compensation, we 
have focused primarily on the option delta because it more accurately captures the degree of incentive alignment 
between managers and shareholders. Although family control is one means of solving the conflict of interest 
between ownership and control, it creates another agency problem through the private benefits of control or the 
potential expropriation of minority shareholders. CEO compensation is one potential remedy for the dual agency 
problems. We posit that family firms (run either by the families or outside CEOs) are less prone to these 
problems than firms without family control or involvement. This conjecture predicts lower CEO incentive pay 
in family firms than in non-family firms.  
We find that, when stock holdings are excluded, both active and passive family firms have lower incentive 
pay than non-family firms, even after controlling for the effects of important CEO- and firm-specific factors. 
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This suggests that, consistent with our conjecture, firms under family control are less subject than other firms to 
dual agency problems, a fact that manifests itself in lower incentive pay among family-controlled firms. Also 
consistent with our conjecture, we do not observe significant differences in incentive pay between active and 
passive family firms. Thus, both types of family firms evidently have comparable agency costs, in spite of 
different sources of agency costs. In addition, we find a non-linear (specifically, a concave) relationship between 
managerial ownership and incentive pay. 
Moreover, without considering family presence or involvement, executive ownership is negatively related to 
incentive pay because ownership itself creates incentives and thus reduces the need for incentive-alignment 
mechanisms. Once family involvement is taken into account, however, ownership no longer matters. This 
suggests that family control consists of more than concentrated ownership. Nonetheless, this non-result is due to 
the offsetting forces from different ownership subgroups. More specifically, executive ownership has different 
incremental effects on incentive pay, depending on the ownership stakes of CEOs—negative for high ownership 
CEOs and positive for their low ownership CEOs, especially in family firms. Therefore, executive ownership 
weakens the need for incentive alignment only when ownership reaches a certain threshold. Taken together, our 
findings suggest that, given family control, managerial ownership reduces the need for incentive pay only when 
the CEO already has a sufficient equity stake. Furthermore, this non-linear relationship generally holds 
irrespective of the degree of family involvement but with different intensities depending on firm type. 
Specifically, the relationship appears to be more pronounced for (passive) family firms than for non-family 
firms, findings that are consistent with the predictions of the dual agency cost hypothesis. 
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Other things equal, higher agency costs should result in lower firm performance or valuation. Using a 
simultaneous equation framework, we find that incentive pay is value-enhancing. In addition, there appears to 
be no significant relationship between degree of family involvement and operating performance (ROA) and 
market valuation (Q) after controlling for important factors that potentially explain both performance measures. 
This is because the direct and indirect effects (through incentive pay) on both measures have opposing signs that 
cancel each other out, a finding that accords with our hypothesis that incentive pay should provide a remedy for 
agency issues. On the one hand, non-family firms may experience higher agency costs than family firms 
because the classic ownership-manager conflict in non-family firms is more costly than the conflict between 
family and non-family shareholders in active family firms. On the other hand, passive family firms might have 
lower agency costs as a result of effective family monitoring. Our findings are in line with the extant literature 
on performance of family firms (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Barontini and Caprio, 2006; Maury, 2006; 
Villalonga and Amit, 2006).   
In summary, we find that family firms and non-family firms have different corporate governance structures. 
Specifically, we find that active family firms have better protection for minority shareholders and smaller boards 
but less board independence. These results indicate that corporate governance is a complex system in which the 
mechanisms involved are neither simple substitutes nor complements. In addition, incentive pay in 
family-controlled firms is lower than in non-family-controlled firms because the former are less subject to dual 
agency problems and thus have lower agency costs. Higher equity ownership reduces the need for 
value-enhancing incentive pay because ownership itself provides incentives that reduce the need for incentive 
27 
 
alignment. Through pay incentives, family presence has a mediating effect on the relationship between family 
control and performance. Higher incentive pay, adopted by non-family firms due to higher agency costs, 
effectively enhances performance, resulting in performance levels similar to those of family firms. Overall, our 
study shows that the incentive pay of family firms differs from that of non-family firms, reflecting different 
agency costs that correspond to varying degrees of family involvement and different sources of agency costs. 
We do not observe differences in performance between family and non-family firms once we account for 
differences in incentive pay adopted by these firms.  
Conclusion 
To conclude, family firms are a prevalent and ubiquitous organizational form in the financial landscape. 
Owing to differing considerations and preferences of families, decision making processes within firms can differ, 
leading to differences in firm value. Our study provides evidence that family firms experience different kinds of 
agency cost, which are manifested in different CEO incentive compensation policies. The paper also 
demonstrates the importance of CEO family affiliation, in addition to family ownership, in classifying family 
firms. We find that firms with differing degrees of family involvement implement differing executive 
equity-based compensation policies. With respect to option-based incentive pay, active and passive family firms 
alike differ from non-family firms. Nevertheless, similar levels of such pay observed in both types of family 
firm suggests that the two different types of firm experience different magnitudes and/or types of agency costs. 
As a result, research based on the standard family firm classification, which considers only family ownership, 
may lead to spurious relationships and implications.  
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics: CEO and Firm Characteristics 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Min P25 P75 Max 
Panel A: CEO Characteristics 
Cash Compensation ($M) 870.04 680.55 920.19 0.00 469.25 1,015.12 21,119.34 
Total Compensation ($M) 2,232.51 1,449.36 6,358.65 0.00 836.79 2,462.38 245,016.90 
Equity-based Incentive Pay ($M) 299.19 132.14 582.82 0.00 58.14 298.85 8,277.63 
Option-based Incentive Pay ($M) 102.34 59.22 185.87 0.00 22.80 124.63 4,319.91 
CEO Age 55.48 55.00 7.71 29.00 50.00 61.00 84.00 
CEO Equity-based Ownership (%) 8.23 2.50 14.47 0.00 1.26 7.38 81.20 
CEO Stock Ownership (%) 3.50 0.68 7.59 0.00 0.19 2.50 62.76 
Panel B: Firm Characteristics 
Firm Size ($MM) 805.40 503.41 1,004.71 0.00 249.22 905.70 10,973.32 
Firm Age 47.35 36.00 35.01 0.00 21.00 60.00 230.00 
Firm Risk 0.55 0.51 0.21 0.18 0.39 0.67 1.53 
Leverage 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.00 0.01 0.31 1.62 
Investment 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.12 0.82 
Dividend Payout 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.45 
ROA 0.08 0.08 0.12 -1.65 0.04 0.13 0.66 
Tobin’s Q 1.78 1.45 1.08 0.39 1.14 2.05 11.13 
GIM Index 8.76 9.00 2.63 2.00 7.00 10.00 17.00 
Entrenchment Index 2.20 2.00 1.29 0.00 1.00 3.00 5.00 
Board Size 7.89 8.00 1.94 1.00 6.00 9.00 15.00 
Inside Director 0.22 0.20 0.12 0.00 0.13 0.29 1.00 
CEO Duality (0/1) 0.54 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
CEO on Compensation Committee (0/1) 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
This table presents summary statistics for selected CEO and firm characteristics of small public firms between 2001 and 
2005. Raw scores are reported, and all variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 2  
Comparisons of Selected Characteristics among Firm Types 
Variable 
Active Family Firm (I) Passive Family Firm (II) Non Family Firm (III) Mean and Median Tests 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median  I－II  II－III  I－III  
Panel A: CEO Characteristics 
Cash Compensation ($M) 898 611 842 694 865 700 0.7698  -0.5615  0.6099  
       [0.4416]  [0.5745]  [0.542]  
       (0.0031)  (0.2488)  (0)  
Total Compensation ($M) 1,937 1,332 1,942 1,419 2,572 1,610 -0.0284  -1.4069  -1.6038  
       [0.9774]  [0.1597]  [0.109]  
       (0.0018)  (0.0176)  (0)  
Equity-based Incentive Pay ($M) 611 311 144 99 165 92 9.8953 *** -1.6502 * 13.2298 *** 
       [0]  [0.0992]  [0]  
       (0)  (0.1994)  (0)  
Option-based Incentive Pay ($M) 113 50 81 57 106 64 2.1616 ** -3.566 *** 0.6347  
       [0.0309]  [0.0004]  [0.5257]  
       (0.2032)  (0.0037)  (0)  
CEO Age 57 58 54 54 55 55 4.3313 *** -1.3823  4.342 *** 
       [0]  [0.1671]  [0]  
       (0)  (0.0945)  (0)  
CEO Equity-based Ownership (%) 20.09 12.27 2.57 1.50 3.04 1.80 17.0808 *** -1.2793  23.0923 *** 
       [0]  [0.201]  [0]  
       (0)  (0.0001)  (0)  
CEO Stock Ownership (%) 9.01 4.61 1.13 0.33 0.96 0.39 13.4701 *** 1.0688  20.0021 *** 
       [0]  [0.2854]  [0]  
       (0)  (0.113)  (0)  
Panel B: Firm Characteristics 
Firm Size ($MM) 838 418 806 533 783 547 0.4195  0.4736  0.9634  
       [0.6749]  [0.6359]  [0.3355] 
       (0.0027)  (0.963)  (0.0003) 
Firm Age 38 30 48 38 53 44 -4.8505 *** -2.454 ** -8.0974 *** 
       [0]  [0.0143]  [0]  
       (0.0001)  (0.0157)  (0)  
Firm Risk 0.587 0.570 0.527 0.478 0.528 0.483 4.4056 *** -0.1132  5.0507 *** 
       [0]  [0.9099]  [0]  
       (0)  (0.8458)  (0)  
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Leverage 0.167 0.117 0.163 0.134 0.196 0.188 0.3674  -3.1894 *** -3.0008 *** 
       [0.7134]  [0.0015]  [0.0027] 
       (0.8537)  (0.0012)  (0.0002) 
Investment 0.084 0.068 0.090 0.060 0.083 0.061 -1.0476  1.5589  0.3373  
       [0.2951]  [0.1193]  [0.736]  
       (0.6628)  (0.6828)  (0.8777) 
Dividend Payout 0.006 0.000 0.010 0.002 0.006 0.000 -3.1419 *** 2.6443 *** -0.4561  
       [0.0017]  [0.0083]  [0.6484] 
       (0)  (0)  (0.1565) 
ROA 0.081 0.086 0.077 0.083 0.079 0.083 0.4842  -0.3097  0.2744  
       [0.6283]  [0.7569]  [0.7838] 
       (0.9407)  (0.4473)  (0.4808) 
Tobin’s Q 1.826 1.540 1.891 1.475 1.700 1.403 -0.8659  2.8842 *** 2.227 ** 
       [0.3868]  [0.004]  [0.0261] 
       (0.8369)  (0.0046)  (0.005)  
GIM Index 7.99 8.00 8.94 9.00 9.17 9.00 -4.8697 *** -1.1729  -6.8996 *** 
       [0]  [0.2412]  [0]  
       (0)  (0.3927)  (0)  
Entrenchment Index 1.73 2.00 2.17 2.00 2.53 3.00 -4.2792 *** -4.0744 *** -9.9148 *** 
       [0]  [0.0001]  [0]  
       (0)  (0.0003)  (0)  
Board Size 7.56 7.00 8.38 8.00 7.87 8.00 -5.3589 *** 4.0696 *** -2.5663 ** 
       [0]  [0.0001]  [0.0104] 
       (0)  (0.0008)  (0.0006) 
Inside Director 0.27 0.25 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.17 5.1317 *** 3.5876 *** 9.8187 *** 
       [0]  [0.0004]  [0]  
       (0)  (0.0004)  (0)  
CEO Duality (0/1) 0.68 1.00 0.36 0.00 0.53 1.00 9.1772 *** -4.7587 *** 5.1887 *** 
       [0]  [0]  [0]  
       (0)  (0)  (0)  
CEO on Compensation 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.3089 ** 0.2831  3.2988 *** 
Committee (0/1)       [0.0212]  [0.7772]  [0.001]  
       (0.0213)  (0.777)  (0.001)  
This table presents means and medians of selected characteristics of subgroups of small public firms between 2001 and 2005. Raw scores are reported, and all 
variables are defined in Appendix A. P-values of the mean (median) tests are reported in brackets (parentheses). The statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 
levels of t-values of the mean tests are represented by symbols *, **, and ***, respectively.
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Table 3  
Family Firm and CEO Incentive Pay 
 Option-based Incentive Pay 
 Baseline Main Ownership 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5): Low (6): High (7): Pooled 
△(Shareholder Wealth) 0.072 0.025 0.028 0.033 0.051 0.067 0.037 
 (1.07) (0.27) (0.31) (0.37) (0.41) (1.48) (0.4) 
△(Shareholder Wealth)*  0.034 0.032 0.055* 0.07 0.029 0.055 
Passive Family Firm  (1.32) (1.18) (1.68) (1.47) (1.42) (1.54) 
△(Shareholder Wealth)*  0.055 0.049 0.064** 0.029 0.046 0.057 
Active Family Firm  (1.28) (1.1) (2.06) (1.1) (1.23) (1.59) 
Passive Family Firm  -0.189*** -0.167*** -0.122*** -0.162*** -0.063** -0.1*** 
  (-8.21) (-8.25) (-4.35) (-3.49) (-2.6) (-3.69) 
Active Family Firm  -0.199** -0.18* -0.167* -0.088* -0.116 -0.186** 
  (-2.31) (-1.76) (-1.96) (-1.9) (-1.14) (-2.08) 
CEO Age -0.092** -0.068* -0.064** -0.076** -0.096*** -0.087* -0.074** 
 (-2.19) (-1.79) (-1.97) (-2.23) (-2.89) (-1.71) (-2.4) 
CEO Equity-based  -0.111** 0.023 0.048 0.009 0.315*** -0.195** 1.002*** 
Ownership (-2.26) (0.36) (0.75) (0.15) (9.53) (-2.03) (13.57) 
CEO Equity-based        -1.012*** 
Ownership^2       (-7.14) 
Firm Size 0.151*** 0.24*** 0.221*** 0.213*** 0.338*** 0.132** 0.219*** 
 (4.53) (6.4) (5.83) (7.8) (20.9) (2.25) (6.47) 
Firm Age -0.126* -0.181*** -0.175*** -0.178*** -0.224*** -0.1 -0.148** 
 (-1.73) (-3.21) (-3.27) (-2.61) (-4.97) (-1.2) (-2.49) 
Leverage 0.013 0.000 -0.004 -0.011 -0.072 0.012 -0.025 
 (0.48) (0.01) (-0.14) (-0.32) (-1.39) (0.21) (-0.91) 
Investment 0.129*** 0.2*** 0.192*** 0.158*** 0.137*** 0.153*** 0.145*** 
 (3.8) (14.12) (22.56) (5.26) (5.24) (4.85) (5.16) 
GIM Index  0.046*      
  (1.73)      
Entrenchment Index   0.163***     
   (4.22)     
Board Size    -0.065*** -0.092** -0.027 -0.058*** 
    (-2.98) (-2.41) (-1.16) (-3.12) 
Inside Director    -0.167*** -0.078 -0.178*** -0.129*** 
    (-4.1) (-1.3) (-4.53) (-3.45) 
CEO Duality    0.106*** 0.049 0.062* 0.069*** 
    (4) (1.52) (1.8) (3.15) 
CEO on Compensation    -0.034* 0.007 -0.047** -0.032** 
Committee    (-1.96) (0.52) (-2) (-2.04) 
        
Year and Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.0355 0.0542 0.0612 0.0614 0.1118 0.0789 0.0838 
Number of Observations 1,742 1,216 1,216 1,356 701 655 1,356 
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This table provides the standardized coefficient estimates for the Tobit regression of CEO incentive pay against the 
change in shareholder wealth while controlling for some executive- and firm-specific attributes. All control variables, 
except for the dummy variables, are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels, respectively, and are defined in the Appendix 
A. Low (Model 5) versus high (Model 6) refer to two separate regressions for the subsamples formed by using the 
median ownership over the whole sample as the cutoff point. Industry fixed effects adopt 1-digit SIC code. Standard 
deviations are clustered at the 1-digit SIC level. T-values are reported in parentheses, and the symbols *, **, and *** 
represent statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
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Table 4 
Family Firm, CEO Ownership, and Incentive Pay 
 Option-based Incentive Pay 
 Active Family Firm Passive Family Firm Non Family Firm 
 (1): Low  (2): High (3): Low  (4): High (5): Low  (6): High 
△(Shareholder Wealth) 0.256*** 0.117*** 0.137*** 0.232*** 0.076 0.036 
 (6.87) (3.49) (7.47) (2.99) (0.49) (1.33) 
CEO Equity-based  0.288*** -0.224*** 0.368*** -0.345** 0.284*** 0.224*** 
Ownership (5.18) (-3.83) (6.21) (-2.03) (6.88) (5.42) 
CEO Age 0.129 -0.087* -0.137 -0.252*** -0.006 -0.013 
 (1.44) (-1.65) (-1.48) (-5.05) (-0.19) (-0.13) 
Firm Size 0.296* 0.14*** 0.255*** -0.227** 0.396*** 0.354*** 
 (1.79) (3.51) (5.12) (-2.35) (7.33) (2.7) 
Firm Age -0.289** -0.13*** -0.295*** 0.087 -0.191** 0.108 
 (-2.43) (-2.94) (-3.38) (0.82) (-2.56) (0.52) 
Leverage -0.199* 0.008 0.006 0.193** -0.123** -0.374*** 
 (-1.89) (0.17) (0.07) (2.3) (-2.18) (-6.85) 
Investment 0.033 0.224*** 0.17 -0.04 0.111** 0.158 
 (0.24) (6.97) (1.41) (-0.4) (2.4) (0.84) 
Board Size -0.26** -0.036 0.046 -0.012 -0.174*** 0.026 
 (-2.07) (-0.72) (0.75) (-0.1) (-3.16) (0.37) 
Inside Director -0.754*** -0.207*** -0.049 -0.271*** -0.043 0.033 
 (-4.52) (-4.18) (-0.55) (-5.42) (-0.88) (0.36) 
CEO Duality 0.013 0.018 0.077 0.123 0.035 0.039 
 (0.13) (0.43) (1.6) (0.68) (0.48) (0.68) 
CEO on Compensation  -0.039 -0.051** 0.089**  -0.053*** 0.029*** 
Committee (-1.33) (-2.11) (1.98)  (-6.23) (3.94) 
       
Year and Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.5436 0.0993 0.1356 0.1956 0.1216 0.0844 
Number of Observations 38 392 249 66 414 197 
This table provides the standardized coefficient estimates for the Tobit regression of CEO incentive pay against 
the change in shareholder wealth while controlling for some executive- and firm-specific attributes. All control 
variables, except for the dummy variables, are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels, respectively, and are 
defined in the Appendix A. Low (Models 1, 3, 5) versus high (Models 2, 4, 6) refer to six separate regressions 
for the subsamples formed by using the median ownership over the whole sample as the cutoff point. Industry 
fixed effects adopt 1-digit SIC code. Standard deviations are clustered at the 1-digit SIC level. T-values are 
reported in parentheses, and the symbols *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 
0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Figure 1 
Simple Illustration of Structural Equation Model 
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Table 5 
Family Firm, CEO Incentive Pay, and Performance 
 (1): ROA (2): Tobin’s Q 
 Direct 
Effect 
Indirect 
Effect 
Total 
Effect 
Direct 
Effect 
Indirect 
Effect 
Total 
Effect 
Option-based Incentive Pay 0.007***  0.007*** 0.14***  0.14*** 
 (5.26)  (5.26) (6.84)  (6.84) 
Passive Family Firm 0.000 -0.002** -0.001 0.128** -0.035** 0.092 
 (0.04) (-2.07) (-0.18) (2.57) (-2.3) (1.53) 
Active Family Firm 0.008 -0.003* 0.005 0.116*** -0.065** 0.05 
 (0.65) (-1.9) (0.35) (3.05) (-2.09) (0.78) 
CEO Age  -0.008*** -0.008***  -0.17*** -0.17*** 
  (-2.99) (-2.99)  (-3.4) (-3.4) 
CEO Equity-based Ownership  0.000 0.000  0.004 0.004 
  (0.36) (0.36)  (0.36) (0.36) 
Firm Size 0.017*** 0.002*** 0.019*** -0.177*** 0.046*** -0.131* 
 (3.55) (3.52) (4.02) (-2.65) (3.9) (-1.95) 
Firm Age -0.023*** -0.003** -0.026*** -0.214*** -0.052** -0.266*** 
 (-3.21) (-2.14) (-3.14) (-3.33) (-2.24) (-3.18) 
Firm Risk -0.158***  -0.158*** -0.552  -0.552 
 (-6.8)  (-6.8) (-1.5)  (-1.5) 
Leverage -0.086*** -0.003* -0.089*** -1.117*** -0.063 -1.18*** 
 (-2.64) (-1.65) (-2.89) (-4) (-1.6) (-4.46) 
Investment -0.025 0.013 -0.011 3.037*** 0.272 3.309*** 
 (-0.3) (1.48) (-0.15) (4.79) (1.53) (4.66) 
Dividend Payout 0.511**  0.511** 7.06***  7.06*** 
 (2.38)  (2.38) (2.96)  (2.96) 
Board Size  -0.000* -0.000*  -0.005 -0.005 
  (-1.69) (-1.69)  (-1.64) (-1.64) 
Inside Director  -0.017*** -0.017***  -0.35*** -0.35*** 
  (-5.05) (-5.05)  (-5.26) (-5.26) 
CEO Duality  0.003*** 0.003***  0.051*** 0.051*** 
  (3.25) (3.25)  (3.26) (3.26) 
       
Equation-level R2: Incentive Pay 0.127 0.126 
Equation-level R2: Performance 0.216 0.282 
Model R2 0.302 0.343 
Number of observations 1,756 1,756 
Structural equation model (SEM) estimates are reported. The total effect is the sum of the direct effect (related to performance) 
and the indirect effect (related to performance through incentive pay). All control variables, except for the dummy variables, 
are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels, respectively, and are defined in the Appendix A. Z-values are reported in parentheses, 
and the symbols *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
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Table 6 
Robustness Checks 
Panel A: Family Firm and CEO Incentive Pay 
 Option-based Incentive Pay 
 Main Ownership 
 (1) (2) (3) (4): Low (5): High (6): Pooled 
△(Shareholder Wealth) 0.045 0.046 0.051 0.062 0.081* 0.057 
 (0.46) (0.48) (0.55) (0.48) (1.67) (0.57) 
△(Shareholder Wealth)* 0.032 0.028 0.03 0.035 0.025 0.026 
Passive Family Firm (1.19) (1.09) (1.19) (0.96) (0.81) (1.05) 
△(Shareholder Wealth)* 0.063 0.06 0.065* 0.022 0.055 0.054 
Active Family Firm (1.29) (1.17) (1.66) (0.96) (1.06) (1.2) 
Passive Family Firm -0.178*** -0.152*** -0.145*** -0.143*** -0.017 -0.09*** 
 (-6.39) (-6.06) (-5.43) (-3.95) (-0.57) (-3.38) 
Active Family Firm -0.396*** -0.372*** -0.371*** -0.047 -0.218 -0.281** 
 (-5.57) (-4.23) (-5.42) (-1.26) (-1.47) (-2.59) 
CEO Age -0.078** -0.076** -0.077** -0.089* -0.088* -0.077*** 
 (-2.12) (-2.29) (-2.6) (-1.77) (-1.86) (-2.63) 
CEO Equity-based  0.214*** 0.231*** 0.222*** 0.293*** -0.084 0.955*** 
Ownership (3.64) (3.97) (4.11) (8.46) (-0.52) (6.52) 
CEO Equity-based       -0.816*** 
Ownership^2      (-3.4) 
       
Firm-specific Control Variables,        
Year and Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.0608 0.0650 0.0644 0.1063 0.0716 0.0785 
Number of Observations 1,194 1,194 1,227 658 569 1,227 
Panel B: Family Firm, CEO Incentive Pay, and Performance 
 (1): ROA (2): Tobin’s Q 
Lagged Performance (t-1) 0.585*** 0.178* 
 (4.59) (1.88) 
Option-based Incentive Pay -0.003 0.275* 
 (-0.22) (1.94) 
Passive Family Firm -0.033 -0.028 
 (-1.12) (-0.07) 
Active Family Firm -0.020 0.350 
 (-0.49) (0.86) 
CEO Age -0.225* 0.320 
 (-1.97) (0.26) 
CEO Equity-based Ownership -0.006 -0.519** 
 (-0.37) (-2.59) 
   
Firm-specific Control Variables Yes Yes 
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.001 0.001 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.613 0.696 
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Hansen test (p-value) 0.332 0.289 
Difference-in-Hansen test (p-value) 0.901 0.197 
Number of Observations 1,101 1,101 
Panel A provides the standardized coefficient estimates for the Tobit regression of CEO incentive pay against the 
change in shareholder wealth while controlling for some executive- and firm-specific attributes. The two family 
dummy variables are fitted values predicted by logit regressions with a set of explanatory variables. Low (Model 4) 
versus high (Model 5) refer to two separate regressions for the subsamples formed by using the median ownership 
over the whole sample as the cutoff point. Following Table 3, firm-specific control variables include firm size, firm 
age, leverage, investment, GIM Index, Entrenchment Index, board size, inside director, CEO duality, and CEO on 
compensation committee. Industry fixed effects adopt 1-digit SIC code. Standard deviations are clustered at the 
1-digit SIC level. Panel B reports GMM estimates. Following Table 5, firm-specific control variables include firm 
size, firm age, firm risk, leverage, investment, dividend payout, board size, inside director, and CEO duality. All 
control variables, except for the dummy variables, are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels, respectively, and are 
defined in the Appendix A. T-values are reported in parentheses, and the symbols *, **, and *** represent statistical 
significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Appendix A 
Variable Labels and Definitions 
Variable Definition Data Source 
CEO Characteristics   
Cash Compensation Total current compensation comprised of salary 
and bonus 
ExecuComp item total_current 
Total Compensation Total compensation (salary + bonus + other annual 
+ restricted stock grants + LTIP payouts + all other 
+ value of option grants) 
ExecuComp item tdc1 
Equity-based Incentive 
Pay 
The change in the value of CEO’s stock holding 
and option portfolio in response to a 1% change in 
the firm’s stock price, scaled by natural logarithm 
 
Option-based Incentive 
Pay 
The change in the value of CEO’s option portfolio 
(only) in response to a 1% change in the firm’s 
stock price, scaled by natural logarithm 
 
CEO Age Age of CEO, scaled by natural logarithm ExecuComp item age 
CEO Equity-based 
Ownership 
Percentage of CEO equity holding, including 
options and equity holding of family members, if 
applicable, scaled by natural logarithm 
Proxy statements (DEF 14A) 
   
CEO Stock Ownership Percentage of CEO shareholding (excluding 
options and equity holding of family members) 
ExecuComp item shrown_excl_opts scaled 
by Compustat item shrsout 
Firm Characteristics   
Ownership Structure   
Active Family Firm A dummy variable that is assigned to one if a firm 
is controlled and managed by the founding family 
member(s), and zero otherwise 
Proxy statements (DEF 14A) 
Passive Family Firm A dummy variable that is assigned to one if a firm 
is controlled but not managed by the founding 
family member(s), and zero otherwise 
Proxy statements (DEF 14A) 
Non-family Firm A dummy variable that is assigned to one if a firm 
is neither controlled nor managed by the founding 
family member(s), and zero otherwise 
Proxy statements (DEF 14A) 
Corporate Governance   
GIM Index Follows Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) RiskMetrics Governance Legacy item 
gindex 
Entrenchment Index Follows Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) RiskMetrics Governance Legacy items 
cboard+supermajor+ppill+goldenparachu
te+lachtr+labylw 
Board Size Number of directors on the board, scaled by 
natural logarithm 
RiskMetrics Directors Legacy 
Inside Director The percentage of inside directors on the board RiskMetrics Directors Legacy 
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CEO Duality A binary variable that equals one when CEO 
serves as company chairman 
RiskMetrics Directors Legacy 
CEO on Compensation 
Committee 
A dummy variable that is assigned to one if CEO 
serves on the compensation committee, and zero 
otherwise 
RiskMetrics Directors Legacy 
Others   
ROA A ratio of earnings before interest and taxes scaled 
by total assets 
Compustat items ebit/at 
Tobin’s Q Market-to-book ratio, defined as total assets plus 
the market value of common stock less the sum of 
book value of common equity and balance sheet 
deferred taxes scaled by total assets 
Compustat items 
(at+csho*prcc_f-ceq-txdb)/at 
Firm Size Annual sales, scaled by natural logarithm Compustat item sale 
Firm Age Difference between the founding year and the data 
year, scaled by natural logarithm 
Online sources (e.g., 
www.funduniverse.com) 
Firm Risk Standard deviation volatility over the past 60 
months 
Compustat item bs_volatility 
Leverage Year-end debt scaled by total assets Compustat items (dltt+dlc)/at 
Investment Sum of capital and R&D expenditures scaled by 
total assets 
Compsutat items (capx+xrd)/at 
Dividend Payout Annual cash dividends scaled by total assets Compustat item dv/at 
Shareholder Wealth Market value of equity Compustat items csho*prcc 
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